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MATERIAL CONSTITUTION AND THE TRINITY 
Jeffrey E. Brower and Michael C. Rea 
The Christian doctrine of the Trinity poses a serious philosophical problem. 
On the one hand, it seems to imply that there is exactly one divine being; on 
the other hand, it seems to imply that there are three. There is another well-
known philosophical problem that presents us with a similar sort of tension: 
the problem of material constitution. We argue in this paper that a relatively 
neglected solution to the problem of material constitution can be developed 
into a novel solution to the problem of the Trinity. 
As is well known, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity poses a serious 
philosophical problem. On the one hand, it affirms that there are three dis-
tinct Persons--Father, Son, and Holy Spirit---each of whom is God. On the 
other hand, it says that there is one and only one God. The doctrine there-
fore pulls us in two directions at once---in the direction of saying that there 
is exactly one divine being and in the direction of saying that there is more 
than one. 
There is another well-known philosophical problem that presents us 
with the same sort of tension: the problem of material constihltion. This 
problem arises whenever it appears that an object a and an object b share 
all of the same parts and yet have different modal properties.' To take just 
one of the many well-worn examples in the literature: Consider a bronze 
statue of the Greek goddess, Athena, and the lump of bronze that consti-
tutes it. On the one hand, it would appear that we must recognize at least 
two material objects in the region occupied by the statue. For presumably 
the statue cannot survive the process of being melted down and recast 
whereas the lump of bronze can. On the other hand, our ordinary counting 
practices lead us to recognize only one material object in the region. As 
Harold Noonan aptly puts it, counting two material objects in such a 
region seems to "manifest a bad case of double vision".> Here, then, as with 
the doctrine of the Trinity, we are pulled in two directions at once. 
Admittedly, the analogy between the two problems is far from perfect. 
But we mention it because, as we shall argue below, it turns out that a rela-
tively neglected response to the problem of material constihltion can be 
developed into a novel solution to the problem of the Trinity. In our view, 
this new solution is more promising than the other solutions available in 
the contemporary literature. It is independently plausible, it is motivated 
by considerations independent of the problem of the Trinity, and it is 
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immune to objections that afflict the other solutions. The guiding intuition 
is the Aristotelian idea that it is possible for an object a and an object b to be 
"one in number"-that is, numerically the same-without being strictly 
identical. 
We will begin in Section 1 by offering a precise statement of the problem 
of the Trinity. In Section 2, we will flesh out the Aristotelian notion of 
"numerical sameness without identity", explain how it solves the problem 
of material constitution, and defend it against what we take to be the most 
obvious and important objections to it. Also in that section we will distin-
guish numerical sameness without identity from two superficially similar 
relations. Finally, in Sections 3 and 4, we will show how the Aristotelian 
solution to the problem of material constitution can be developed into a 
solution to the problem of the Trinity, and we will highlight some of the 
more interesting consequences of the solution we describe.3 
1. The Problem of The Trinity 
The central claim of the doctrine of the Trinity is that God exists in three 
Persons-Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This claim is not problematic 
because of any superficial incoherence or inconsistency with well-
entrenched intuitions. Rather, it is problematic because of a tension that 
results from constraints imposed on its interpretation by other aspects of 
orthodox Christian theology. These constraints are neatly summarized in 
the following passage from the so-called Athanasian Creed: 
We worship one God in Trinity and Trinity in unity, neither confusing 
the Persons, nor dividing the substance. For there is one person for 
the Father, another for the Son, and yet another for the Holy Spirit. 
But the divinity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is one ... The 
Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, and the Holy Spirit is eternal; and 
yet they are not three eternals, but there is one eternal. Likewise, the 
Father is almighty, the Son is almighty, and the Holy Spirit is 
almighty; and yet there are not three almighties, but there is one 
almighty. Thus, the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit 
is God; and yet there are not three Gods, but there is one God.4 
The passage quoted here is widely-and rightly-taken to offer a para-
digm statement of the orthodox understanding of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. Moreover, it tells us that the doctrine of the Trinity must be under-
stood in such a way as to be compatible with each of the following theses: 
(Tl) Each Person of the Trinity is distinct from each of the others. 
(T2) Each Person of the Trinity is God. 
(T3) There is exactly one God. 
Each of these theses is affirmed by the Creed in order to rule out a spe-
cific heresy. Tl is intended to rule out modalism, the view that Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit are not really distinct from one another. According 
to modalism, each Person is just God in a different guise, or playing a 
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different role-much like Superman and Clark Kent are just the 
Kryptonian Kal-EI in different guises, or playing different roles. T2 is 
intended to rule out subordination ism, the view that not all of the Persons 
are divine, or that the divinity of one or more of the Persons is somehow 
unequal with, or subordinate to, that of the others. T3 is intended to rule 
out polytheism, the view that there is more than one God. The problem, 
however, is that the conjunction of Tl - T3 is apparently incoherent. For 
on their most natural interpretation, they imply that three distinct beings 
are each identical with one being (since each of the Persons is God, and 
yet there is only one God). 
In the contemporary literature, there are two main strategies for solv-
ing the problem: the Relative-Identity strategy, and the Social-Trinitarian 
strategy. Both of these strategies solve the problem at least in part by 
denying that the words 'is God' in Trinitarian formulations mean 'is 
absolutely identical with God'. Thus both are well-poised to avoid the 
heresy of modalism.5 Furthermore, both affirm T2 (or some suitable vari-
ant thereof); thus, subordinationism is not a worry either. The real ques-
tion is whether either manages to avoid polytheism without incurring 
other problems in the process. In our view, the answer is no-at least not 
as these solutions have been developed in the literature so far. Social 
Trinitarianism we reject outright. The Relative-Identity solution we reject 
as a stand-alone solution to the problem of the Trinity. (That is, we think 
that it is successful only if it is supplemented by a story about the meta-
physics of relative-identity relations. More on this at the end of Section 2 
below). Since we have already explained elsewhere why we find these 
solutions unsatisfying, we will not repeat the details of our objections 
here.6 Instead, we'll simply summarize by saying that we reject both the 
Social Trinitarian solution and existing versions of the Relative Identity 
solution because they fail to provide an account of the Trinity that satis-
fies the following five desiderata: 
(01) It is clearly consistent with the view that Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit are divine individuals, and that there is exactly 
one divine individual. 
(02) It does not conflict with a natural reading of either the Bible 
or the ecumenical creeds. 
(03) It is consistent with the view that God is an individual rather 
than a society, and that the Persons are not parts of God.7 
(04) It is consistent with the view that classical identity exists and 
is not to be analyzed in terms of more fundamental sortal-
relativized sameness relations like being the same person as. 
(05) It carries no anti-realist commitments in metaphysics. 
The Social Trinitarian solution violates 01 - 03. Extant versions of the 
Relative Identity solution violate 01, 04, or 05. As will emerge shortly, our 
solution, which may fruitfully be thought of as an appropriately supple-
mented version of the Relative Identity solution, succeeds precisely where 
these others fail-namely, in satisfying all five desiderata. 
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2. Sameness Without Identity and the Problem of Material Constitution 
The point of departure for our solution is Aristotle's notion of "accidental 
sameness". Elsewhere, we have proposed (for the sake of argument, at any 
rate) that the phenomenon of material constitution be understood in terms 
of accidental sameness.8 What we here propose is that the unity of the 
divine Persons also be understood in terms of this relation (or more accu-
rately, in terms of the genus of which it is a species-namely, numerical 
sameness without identity"). In this section, therefore, we review the way 
in which appeal to accidental sameness provides a solution to the problem 
of material constitution and address what we take to be the most natural 
objections to it. 
2.1 Accidental Sameness Characterized. According to Aristotle, familiar par-
ticulars (trees, cats, human beings, etc.) are hylomorphic compounds-
things that exist because and just so long as some matter instantiates a cer-
tain kind of form. Forms, for Aristotle, are complex organizational proper-
ties, and properties are immanent universals (or, as some have it, tropes). 
The matter of a thing is not itself an individual thing; rather, it is that which 
combines with a form to make an individual thing. 1O Thus, for example, a 
human being exists just in case some matter instantiates the complex orga-
nizational property humanity. Each human being depends for its continued 
existence on the continued instantiation of humanity by some matter; and 
each human being is appropriately viewed as a composite whose parts (at 
one level of decomposition) are just its matter and (its) humanity.l1 
On Aristotle's view, living organisms are the paradigmatic examples of 
material objects. But Aristotle also acknowledges the existence of other 
hylomorphic compounds. Thus, books, caskets, beds, thresholds, hands, 
hearts, and various other non-organisms populate his ontology, and (like 
an organism) each one exists because and only so long as some matter 
instantiates a particular complex organizational property.12 Indeed, 
Aristotle even countenances what Gareth Matthews calls "kooky" 
objects-objects like 'seated-Socrates', a thing that comes into existence 
when Socrates sits down and which passes away when Socrates ceases to 
be seatedY Seated-Socrates is an 'accidental unity' -a unified thing that 
exists only by virtue of the instantiation of an accidental (non-essential) 
property (like seatedness) by a substance (like Socrates). The substance 
plays the role of matter in this sort of hylomorphic compound (though, of 
course, unlike matter properly conceived, the substance is a pre-existing 
individual thing), and the accidental property plays the role of form. 
Accidental sameness, according to Aristotle, is just the relation that obtains 
between an accidental unity and its parent substance. 14 
One might balk at this point on the grounds that Aristotle's accidental 
unities are just a bit too kooky for serious ontology. We see that Socrates 
has seated himself; but why believe that in doing so he has brought into 
existence a new object-seated-Socrates? Indeed, one might think it's clear 
that we shouldn't believe this. For there is nothing special about seatedness, 
and so, if we acknowledge the existence of seated-Socrates, we must also 
acknowledge the existence of a myriad other kooky objects: pale-Socrates, 
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bald-Socrates, barefoot-Socrates, and so on. But surely there are not mil-
lions of objects completely overlapping Socrates. 
Fair enough; and nothing here depends on our believing in seated-
Socrates or his cohorts. But note that, regardless of what we think of seat-
ed-Socrates, we (fans of common sense) believe in many things relevantly 
like seated-Socrates. That is, we believe in things that are very plausibly 
characterized as hylomorphic compounds whose matter is a familiar materi-
al object and whose form is an accidental property. For example, we believe 
in fists and hands, bronze statues and lumps of bronze, cats and heaps of 
cat tissue, and so on. Why we should believe all this but not that sitting 
down is a way of replacing one kind of object (a standing-man) with anoth-
er (a seated-man) is an interesting and surprisingly difficult question. But 
never mind that for now. The important point here is that, whether we go 
along with Aristotle in believing in what he calls accidental unities, the fact 
is that many of us will be inclined to believe in things relevantly like acci-
dental unities along with other things that are relevantly like the parent 
substances of accidental unities. 
This last point is important because the things we have listed as being 
relevantly like accidental unities and their parent substances are precisely 
the sorts of things belief in which gives rise to the problem of material con-
stitution. Hence the relevance of Aristotle's doctrine of accidental same-
ness. Aristotle agrees with common sense in thinking that there is only one 
material object that fills the region occupied by Socrates when he is seated. 
Thus, he says that the relation between accidental unities and their parent 
substances is a variety of numerical sameness. Socrates and seated-Socrates 
are, as he would put it, one in number but not one in being. IS They are dis-
tinct, but they are to be counted as one material object. lo But once one is 
committed to believing in such a relation, one has a solution to the problem 
of material constitution ready to hand. Recall that the problem arises 
whenever it appears that an object a and an object b share all of the same 
parts and yet have different modal properties. In such cases we are pushed 
in the direction of denying that the relevant a and b are identical and yet 
we also want to avoid saying that they are two material objects occupying 
the same place at the same time. Belief in the relation of accidental same-
ness solves this problem because it allows us to deny that the relevant a 
and b are identical without thereby committing us to the claim that a and b 
are two material objects. Thus, one can continue to believe that (e.g.) there 
are bronze statues and lumps of bronze, that every region occupied by a 
bronze statue is occupied by a lump of bronze, that no bronze statue is 
identical to a lump of bronze (after all, statues and lumps have different 
persistence conditions), but also that there are never two material objects 
occupying precisely the same place at the same time. One can believe all 
this because one can say that bronze statues and their constitutive lumps 
stand in the relation of accidental sameness: they are one in number but 
not one in being. 
2.2 Accidental Sameness Defended. But should we believe in accidental same-
ness? The fact of the matter is that this sort of solution to the problem of 
material constitution is probably the single most neglected solution to that 
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problem in the contemporary literature; and it is not hard to see why. 
Initially it is hard to swallow the idea that there is a variety of numerical 
sameness that falls short of identity. But, in our view, the most obvious and 
serious objections are failures, and the bare fact that the doctrine of acci-
dental sameness is counterintuitive is mitigated by the fact that every solu-
tion to the problem of material constitution is counterintuitive (a fact which 
largely explains the problem's lasting philosophical interest). In the 
remainder of this section, we will address what we take to be the four most 
serious objections against the doctrine of accidental sameness. We will also 
explain how the relation of accidental sameness differs from two other 
relations to which it bears some superficial resemblance. In doing all this, 
we hope to shed further light on the metaphysics of material objects that 
attends belief in accidental sameness. 
First objection: Most contemporary philosophers think that, for any 
material objects a and b, a and b are to be counted as one if and only if a and 
b are identical. Indeed, it is fairly standard to define number in terms of 
identity, as follows: 
(IF) there is exactly one F =df 3x(Fx & 'Vy(Fy == Y = x) 
(2F) there are exactly two Fs =df 3x3y(Fx & Fy & x#- y &'Vz(Fz == y = z 
v x ==z) 
etc. 
But if that is right, then it is hard to see how there could be a relation that 
does not obey Leibniz's Law but is nevertheless such that objects standing 
in that relation are to be counted as one. 
Obviously enough, a believer in accidental sameness must reject stan-
dard definitions like IF and 2F. But this does not seem to us to be an espe-
cially radical move. As is often pointed out, common sense does not 
always count by identity.17 If you sell a piano, you won't charge for the 
piano and for the lump of wood, ivory, and metal that constitutes it. As a 
fan of common sense, you will probably believe that there are pianos and 
lumps, and that the persistence conditions of pianos differ from the persis-
tence conditions of lumps. Still, for sales purposes, and so for common 
sense counting purposes, pianos and their constitutive lumps are counted 
as one material object. One might say that common sense is wrong to count 
this way. But why go along with that? Even if we grant that IF and its rela-
tives are strongly intuitive, we must still reckon with the fact that we have 
strong intuitions that support the following: 
(Me) In the region occupied by a bronze statue, there is a statue 
and there is a lump of bronze; the lump is not identical with 
the statue (the statue but not the lump would be destroyed if 
the lump were melted down and recast in the shape of a 
disc); but only one material object fills that region. 
If we did not have intuitions that support Me, there would be no problem of 
material constitution. But if Me is true, then IF and its relatives are false, and 
there seems to be no compelling reason to prefer the latter over the former. 
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Of course, if rejecting IF and its relatives were to leave us without any 
way of defining number, then our move would be radical, and there would 
be compelling reason to give up MC But the fact is, rejecting IF and its rel-
atives does not leave us in any such situation. Indeed, belief in accidental 
sameness doesn't even preclude us altogether from counting by identity. 
At worst, it simply requires us to acknowledge a distinction between sor-
tals that permit counting by identity and sortals that do not. For example, 
according to the believer in accidental sameness, we do not count material 
objects by identity. Rather, we count them by numerical sameness (the 
more general relation of which both accidental sameness and identity are 
species). Thus: 
(1M) there is exactly one material object =df3x(X is a material object 
& Vy(y is a material object == y is numerically the same as x)) 
(2M) there are exactly two material objects =df3x3y(x is a material 
object & y is a material object and x is not numerically the 
same as y and Vz(z is a material object == z is numerically the 
same as x or z is numerically the same as y) 
etc. 
Perhaps the same is true for other familiar sortals. For example: Suppose a 
lump of bronze that constitutes a bronze statue is nominally, but not essen-
tially, a statue.18 Then the lump and the statue are distinct, and both are stat-
ues. But, intuitively, the region occupied by the lump / statue is occupied by 
only one statue. Thus, given the initial supposition, we should not count stat-
ues by identity either. Nevertheless, we can still grant that there are some 
sortals that do allow us to count by identity. Likely candidates are technical 
philosophical sortals like 'hylomorphic compound', or maximally general 
sortals, like 'thing' or 'being'. For such sortals, number terms can be defined 
in the style of IF and its relatives. Admittedly, the business of definillg num-
ber is a bit more complicated for those who believe in accidental sameness 
(we must recognize at least two different styles of defining number corre-
sponding to two different kinds of sortal terms). The important point, how-
ever, is that it is not impossible. 
In saying what we have about the categories of hylomorphic compound, 
thing, and being, we grant that proponents of our Aristotelian solution to the 
problem of material constitution are committed to a kind of co-Iocationism. 
Although cases of material constitution will never, on the view we are 
proposing, present us with two material objects in the same place at the 
same time, they will present us with (at least) two hylomorphic compounds or 
things in the same place at the same time. But we deny that this commitrnent 
is problematic. By our lights, it is a conceptual truth that material objects can-
not be co-located; but it is not a conceptual truth that hylomorphjc com-
pounds (e.g., a statue and a lump, a fist and a hand, etc.) or things (e.g., a 
material object and an event) cannot be co-located. We take it as an advan-
tage of the Aristotelian solution that it respects these prima facie truths. 
Second objection: To say that hylomorphic compounds, or mere things, 
can be co-located but material objects cannot smacks of pretense. For while 
it preserves the letter, it does not preserve the spirit of the intuition that 
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material objects cannot be co-located. If counting two material objects in 
the same place at the same time "reeks of double counting",'9then the same 
reek must attend the counting of two hylomorphic compounds or two 
things in the same place at the same time. At best, therefore, the 
Aristotelian solution is only verbally distinct from the co-Iocationist solu-
tion. For co-Iocationists and fans of accidental sameness will still have the 
same metaphysical story to tell about statues and their constitutive lumps-
namely, that they are distinct, despite occupying precisely the same region 
of spacetime-and that metaphysical story is all that matters. 
But this objection is sound only on the assumption that the properties 
being a material object, being a hylomorphic compound, and being a thing are on 
a par with one another. From x is a hylomorphic compound & y is a hylo-
morphic compound & x "" y, we rightly infer that x and yare two hylomor-
phic compounds. And if, somehow, we come to believe that x and y are co-
located, we'd have no choice but to conclude that x and yare two distinct 
hylomorphic compounds sharing the same place at the same time. The rea-
son is that the following seems to be a necessary truth about the property 
of being a hylomorphic compound: 
(HI) x is a hylomorphic compound iff x is a matter-form compos-
ite; exactly one hylomorphic compound fills a region R iff 
some matter instantiates exactly one form; and x is (numeri-
cally) the same hylomorphic compound as y iff x is a hylo-
morphic compound and x = y. 
According to the second objection, a parallel principle expresses a neces-
sary truth about the property of being a material object: 
(MI) x is a material object iff x is a hylomorphic compound; exact-
ly one material object fills a region R iff exactly one hylomor-
phic compound fills R; and x is (numerically) the same mate-
rial object as y iff x is a material object and x = y 
Note that MI is not a mere linguistic principle; it is a substantive claim 
about the necessary and sufficient conditions for having a material object in 
a region, having exactly one material object in a region, and having (numeri-
cally) the same material object in a region. But MI is a claim that will be 
denied by proponents of the Aristotelian solution we have been describing 
here. As should by now be clear, proponents of that solution will reject MI 
in favor of something like M2: 
(M2) x is a material object iff x is a hylomorphic compound; exact-
ly one material object fills a region R iff at least one hylomor-
phic compound fills R; and x is (numerically) the same mate-
rial object as y iff x and yare hylomorphic compounds shar-
ing the same matter in common. 
M2 is equivalent to MI on the assumption that no two hylomorphic com-
pounds can share the same matter in common; but, short of treating the 
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technical philosophical category hylomorphic compound as co-extensive with 
the common-sense category material object, it is hard to see what would 
motivate that assumption. Thus, there is room for disagreement on the 
question whether M2 is true or whether M2 is equivalent to Ml; and, 
importantly, accidental-sameness theorists and co-Iocationists will come 
down on different sides of those questions. Thus, there is a substantive (as 
opposed to a merely verbal) disagreement to be had here after all. 
Two further points should be made before we move on to the third 
objection. First, though M2 is specifically a thesis about the property being 
a material object, the doctrine of accidental sameness makes it plausible to 
think that similar theses about various other properties will be true. In par-
ticular, if one thinks that sortals like 'cat', 'house', 'lump', 'statue', and so 
on can apply nominally to things that constitute cats, houses, lumps, or 
statues, then something like M2 is true of most familiar composite object 
kinds. Second, though it may be tempting to think that the relation of acci-
dental sameness (or of numerical sameness without identity) is nothing 
other than the relation of sharing exactly the same matter, as we see it, this 
isn't quite correct. On our view (though probably not on Aristotle's), the 
relation of numerical sameness without identity can hold between immater-
ial objects, so long as the relevant immaterial objects are plausibly thought 
of on analogy with hylomorphic compounds. Thus, it is inappropriate to 
say (as might so far seem natural to say) that the relation of numerical 
sameness without identity is nothing other than the relation of material 
constitution. Rather, what is appropriate to say is that material constitu-
tion is a species of numerical sameness without identity. 
Third objection: The principles for counting that we have just described 
(i.e., HI and M2) are apparently inconsistent with the doctrine of accidental 
sameness. To see why, consider the following argument. Let Athena be a 
particular bronze statue; let Lump be the lump of bronze that constitutes it. 
Let R be the region filled by Athena and Lump. Then: 
(1) Athena is identical with the material object in R whose matter is 
arranged statuewise. 
(2) Lump is identical with the material object in R whose matter is 
arranged lumpwise. 
(3) The material object whose matter is arranged statuewise is 
identical with the material object whose matter is arranged 
lumpwise. 
(4) Therefore, Athena is identical with Lump (contrary to the doc-
trine of accidental sameness). 
The crucial premise, of course, is premise 3; and premise 3 seems to follow 
directly from a proposition that is entailed by the facts of the example in 
conjunction with our remarks about counting-namely, that there is exact-
ly one object in R whose matter is arranged both statuewise and lumpwise. 
On reflection, however, it is easy to see that this objection is a nonstarter. 
For premise 3 follows only if the doctrine of accidental sameness is false. 
Numerical sameness, according to Aristotle, does not entail identity. Thus, 
if his view is correct, it does not follow from the fact that there is exactly 
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one material object in R whose matter is arranged both statuewise and 
lumpwise that the object whose matter is arranged lumpwise is identical 
with the object whose matter is arranged statuewise. Simply to assume 
otherwise, then, is to beg the question. One might insist that the assump-
tion is nevertheless highly intuitive, and therefore legitimate. But, again, 
the right response here is that every solution to the problem of material con-
stitution is such that its denial is highly intuitive. That is why we have a 
problem. Successfully rejecting a solution requires showing that the intu-
itive cost is higher with the objectionable solution than with some other 
solution; but, with respect to the doctrine of accidental sameness, this has 
not yet been done. 
Fourth objection: We say that there is one (and only one) material object 
that fills a region just in case the region is filled by matter unified in any 
object-constituting way. So consider a region R that is filled by matter 
arranged both lumpwise and statuewise. What is the object in R? What are 
its essential properties? If there is exactly one object in R, these two ques-
tions should have straightforward answers. But they do not (at least not so 
long as we continue to say that there is a statue and a lump in R). Thus, 
there is reason to doubt that there could really be exactly one object in R. 
This is probably the most serious objection of the lot. But there is a per-
fectly sensible reply: To the first question, the correct answer is that the 
object is both a statue and a lump; to the second question there is no correct 
answer.20 If the doctrine of accidental sameness is true, a statue and its con-
stitutive lump are numerically the same object. This fact seems sufficient 
to entitle believers in accidental sameness to say that the object in R 'is' 
both a statue and a lump, so long as they don't take this to imply either 
that the statue is identical to the lump or that some statue or lump exempli-
fies contradictory essential properties. But if this view is right, how could 
there be any correct answer to the question "What are its essential proper-
ties?" absent further information about whether the word 'it' is supposed 
to refer to the statue or the lump? The pronoun is ambiguous, as is the 
noun ('the object in R') to which it refers.2! Thus, we would need to disam-
biguate before answering the question. Does this imply that there are two 
material objects in R? It might appear to because we are accustomed to 
finding ambiguity only in cases where a noun or pronoun refers to two 
objects rather than one. But if the doctrine of accidental sameness is true, 
we should also expect to find such ambiguity in cases of accidental same-
ness. Thus, to infer from the fact of pronoun ambiguity the conclusion that 
there must be two objects in R is simply to beg the question against the 
doctrine of accidental sameness. 
So much for objections. Now, in closing this section, we would like to 
make it clear how accidental sameness differs from two apparently similar 
relations. 
Those who have followed the recent literature on material constitution 
will know that, like us, Lynne Baker has spoken of a relation that stands 
"between identity and separate existence" (2000: 29) and that this relation 
is (on her view) to be identified with the relation of material constitution. 
On hearing this characterization, one might naturally think that what 
Baker has in mind is something very much like accidental sameness. In 
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fact, however, the similarity between accidental sameness and Baker-style 
constitution ends with the characterization just quoted. Baker's definition 
of constitution is somewhat complicated; but for present purposes we 
needn't go into the details. Suffice it to say that, according to Baker, the 
relation of material constitution is neither symmetric nor transitive where-
as accidental sameness is both symmetric and transitive. (At least, it is syn-
chronically transitive.) Lacking the same formal properties, the two rela-
tions could not possibly be the same.22 
OI'le might also naturally wonder whether what we call 'numerical same-
ness without identity' isn't just good old-fashioned relative identity under a 
different name. Different views have been advertised in the literature under 
the label 'relative identity'. But one doctrine that virtually all of these views 
(and certainly all that deserve the label) share in common is the following: 
(R1) States of affairs of the following sort are possible: x is an F, y 
is an F, x is a G, y is a G, x is the same F as y, but x is not the 
sameG asy. 
This is a claim that we will endorse too; and, like those who endorse the 
Relative-Identity solution to the problem of the Trinity, it is a truth we rely 
on in order to show that T1 - T3 are consistent with one another. It is for 
this reason, and this reason alone, that we say that our solution may fruit-
fully be thought of as a version of the Relative Identity strategy. Despite 
our commitment to R1, it would be a mistake to suppose that we endorse a 
doctrine of relative identity. Our solution to the problem of the Trinity is 
therefore importantly different from the Relative-Identity solution in its 
purest form.23 
How is it possible to accept R1 while at the same time rejecting relative 
identity? The answer, as we see it, is that identity is truly relative only if 
one of the following claims is true: 
(R2) Statements of the form 'x = y' are incomplete and therefore 
ill-formed. A proper identity statement has the form 'x is the 
same F as y'. 
(R3) Sortal-relative identity statements are more fundamental 
than absolute identity statements.24 
R2 is famously associated with P. T. Geach (1967, 1969, and 1973), whereas 
R3 is defended by, among others, Nicholas Griffin (1977).25 Views accord-
ing to which classical identity exists and is no less fundamental than other 
sameness relations are simply not views according to which identity is rela-
tive. Perhaps, on those views, there are multiple sameness relations; and 
perhaps some of those relations are both sortal-relative and such that R1 is 
true of them. But so long as classical identity exists and is in no way deriva-
tive upon or less fundamental than they are, there seems to be no reason 
whatsoever to think of other "sameness" relations as identity relations. 
Thus, on views that reject both R2 and R3, there seems to be no reason for 
thinking that identity is relative. 
The difference between accidental sameness and relative identity is 
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important, especially in the present context, because it highlights the fact that 
there is more than one way to make sense of sameness without identity. It is 
for this reason that endorsing Rl apart from R2 or R3 won't suffice all by 
itself to solve the problem of the Trinity. As we have argued elsewhere (Rea 
2003), absent an appropriate supplemental story about the metaphysics 
underlying relative-identity relations, endorsing Rl apart from R2 or R3 
leaves one, at best, with an incomplete solution to the problem of the Trinity 
and, at worst, with an heretical solution.26 We think that the doctrine of acci-
dental sameness provides the right sort of supplemental story, and that the 
solution it yields (in conjunction with Rl) is both complete and orthodox. 
We suspect, moreover, that failure to distinguish different ways of mak-
ing sense of sameness without identity is partly responsible for the attrac-
tion that the Relative-Identity solution holds for many. As is well known, 
respected Christian philosophers and theologians-such as Augustine, 
Anselm, and Aquinas-habitually speak of the Trinity in ways that require 
the introduction of a form of sameness that fails Leibniz Law. But this way 
of speaking, it is often assumed, can only be explained in terms of relative 
identity.27 In light of what has just been said, however, we can see that this 
assumption is false. Sameness without identity does not imply relative 
identity, and hence any appeal to such sameness either to determine the 
views of actual historical figures or to provide authoritative support for a 
(pure) Relative-Identity solution is wholly misguided. Relative identity 
does provide one way of explaining (numerical) sameness without identi-
ty, but it does not provide the only way of explaining it. 
3. Sameness Without Identity and the Problem of The Trinity 
If we accept the Aristotelian solution to the problem of material constitution, 
then, as we have seen, the familiar particulars of experience must be con-
ceived of as hylomorphic compounds-that is, as matter-form structures 
related to other things sharing their matter by the relation of accidental 
sameness. The relevance of this Aristotelian solution to the problem of the 
Trinity is perhaps already clear. For like the familiar particulars of experi-
ence, the Persons of the Trinity can also be conceived of in terms of hylomor-
phic compounds. Thus, we can think of the divine essence as playing the 
role of matter; and we can regard the properties being a Father, being a Son, 
and being a Spirit as distinct forms instantiated by the divine essence, each 
giving rise to a distinct Person. As in the case of matter, moreover, we can 
regard the divine essence not as an individual thing in its own right but 
rather as that which, together with the requisite "fom1", constitutes a Person. 
Each Person will then be a compound structure whose matter is the divine 
essence and whose form is one of the three distinctive Trinitarian properties. 
On this way of thinking, the Persons of the Trinity are directly analogous to 
particulars that stand in the familiar relation of material constitution. 
Of course, there are also some obvious disanalogies. For example, in 
contrast to ordinary material objects, the role of matter in the case of the 
Trinity is played by immaterial stuff, and so the structures or compounds 
constituted from the divine essence (namely, the divine persons) will be 
'hylomorphic' only in an extended sense. Also, in the case of material 
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objects, the form of a particular hylomorphic compound will typically only 
be contingently instantiated by the matter. Not so, however, in the case of 
the Trinity. For Christian orthodoxy requires us to say that properties like 
being a Father and being a Son are essentially such as to be instantiated by 
the divine essence. As we have seen, moreover, the relation of accidental 
sameness on which our solution is modeled is, in Aristotle anyway, para-
digmatically a relation between a substance (e.g., a man) and a hylomorphic 
structure built out of the substance and an accidental property. The 
Persons, however, are not like this. Thus, it is at best misleading to say that 
the relation between them is one of accidental sameness. Better instead to go 
with the more general label we have used throughout this paper: the 
Persons stand in the relation of numerical sameness without identity. 
As far as we can tell, none of these dis analogies are of deep import. It 
seems not at all inappropriate to think of the divine Persons on analogy 
with hylomorphic compounds; and once we do think of them this way, the 
problem of the Trinity disappears. Return to the analogy with material 
objects: According to the Aristotelian solution to the problem of material 
constitution, a statue and its constitutive lump are two distinct hylomor-
phic compounds; yet they are numerically one material object. Likewise, 
then, the Persons of the Trinity are three distinct Persons but numerically 
one God. The key to understanding this is just to see that the right way to 
count Gods resembles the right way to count material objects. Thus: 
(GI) x is a God iff x is a hylomorphic compound whose "matter" 
is some divine essence; x is the same God as y iff x and y are 
each hylomorphic compounds whose "matter" is some 
divine essence and x's "matter" is the same "matter" as y's; 
and there is exactly one God iff there is an x such that x is a 
God and every God is the same God as x. 
And, in light of GI, the following principle also seems reasonable: 
(G2) x is God iff x is a God and there is exactly one God. 
If these principles are correct, and if (as Christians assume) there are three 
(and only three) Persons that share the same divine essence, then we arrive 
directly at the central Trinitarian claims T1 - T3 without contradiction. For 
in that case, there will be three distinct Persons; each Person will be God (and 
will be the same God as each of the other Persons); and there will be exactly 
one God. Admittedly, if Gl is taken all by itself and without explanation, it 
might appear just as mysterious as the conjunction of T1 - T3 initially 
appeared. But that is to be expected. What is important is that once the par-
allel with M2 is appreciated, and the doctrine of numelical sameness without 
identity is understood and embraced, much of the mystery goes away. 
We are now in a position to see how our Aristotelian account of the Trinity 
meets the desiderata we set out earlier for an adequate solution to the problem 
of the Trinity (namely, 01-05). As should already be clear, our solution 
resolves the apparent inconsistency of T1 - T3 in the same basic way that 
Relative-Identity and Social-Trinitarian solutions do: namely, by rejecting the 
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idea that the words 'is God' in Trinitarian statements like "Each of the Persons 
is God" mean 'is absolutely identical with God'. According to our solution, 
these words should be interpreted to mean 'is numerically the same as the one 
and only God'. But once this interpretation of T2 is adopted-together with a 
proper understanding of the relata of the relation of numerical sameness with-
out identity-the apparent inconsistency of T1 - T3 is resolved, and in a way 
that satisfies 01 and 02. For inasmuch as the Persons of the Trinity are dis-
tinct hylomorphic compounds, they are distinct from one another (hence T1 is 
true); and inasmuch as they are each numerically the same as the one and only 
God, each of them is God and there is only one God (hence T2 and T3 are 
true). Moreover, since our solution implies that each of the Persons is a divine 
individual who is one in number with each of the other two Persons, it is consis-
tent with the claim that there are three Persons but exactly one divine individ-
ual (thus satisfying 01),28 and it also seems to preserve the intention of tradi-
tional formulations of the doctrine of the Trinity (thereby satisfying 02). 
It should also be clear how our solution meets the other desiderata. Unlike 
(pure) Relative-Identity solutions, ours is compatible with the claim that clas-
sical identity exists and is as fundamental as any other sameness relation (and 
hence satisfies 04). Moreover, it supplies an explanation for why 'x = y' does 
not follow from' x is the same God as y'. Unlike Social-Trinitarian strategies, 
on the other hand, ours is clearly compatible with the view that God is an 
individual rather than a society, and that the Persons are not parts of God 
(and hence satisfies 03). Furthermore, our story about the unity of the 
Persons exploits what we take to be a plausible story about the unity of dis-
tinct hylomorphic compounds, whereas no similarly plausible analogy seems 
to be available to the social Trinitarian. Finally, though we deny that it makes 
sense to say, unequivocally, that each of the Persons is absolutely identical 
with God, our view-unlike either of the other two strategies-allows us to 
say that the Father is identical with God, the Son is identical with God, the 
Holy Spirit is identical with God, and yet the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are 
distinct from one another. And it can do all of this without introducing any 
anti-realist commitments in metaphysics (thus satisfying 05). Consider a 
parallel drawn from one of our earlier examples: Athena is identical to the 
material object in R; Lump is identical to the material object in R; but Athena 
is distinct from Lump. Since 'the material object in R' is ambiguous, there is 
no threat of contradiction; and the doctrine of numerical sameness without 
identity blocks an inference to the claim that Lump and Athena are co-located 
material objects. Likewise in the case of the Trinity. 
For all these reasons, therefore, our Aristotelian solution to the problem 
of the Trinity seems to us to be the most philosophically promising and 
theologically satisfying solution currently on offer. 
4. Important Consequences 
This completes our defense of the Aristotelian account of the Christian doc-
trine of the Trinity. As we see it, however, this account is not only interest-
ing in its own right, but also has several important consequences. We close 
by calling attention to two of these. 
First, our solution suggests a revision in our understanding of the 
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nature of the copula. Philosophers traditionally distinguish what is called 
the 'is' of predication from the 'is' of identity. It is sometimes added, more-
over, that any solution to the problem of material constitution that denies 
that constitution is identity must introduce a third sense of 'is'. As Lynne 
Baker says: 
If the constitution view [i.e., the view that constitution is not identity] 
is correct, then there is a third sense of 'is', distinct from the other 
two. The third sense of 'is' is the 'is' of constitution (as in 'is (consti-
tuted by) a piece of marble').29 
Baker seems to think that if constitution is not identity, there will have to 
be three main senses of the copula, each co-ordinate with the other two. 
But we can now see that this is a mistake. If our account of the Trinity is 
correct, constitution can be explained in terms of something other than 
identity (namely, accidental sameness). Even so, there will be only two 
main senses of the copula, namely, the traditional 'is' of predication and a 
heretofore unrecognized sense of the copula, the 'is' of numerical same-
ness. There will still be an 'is' of identity and an 'is' of constitution, as Baker 
suggests, but these will both be subsumed under the second of the two 
main senses just mentioned. Indeed, if we take into account all of the 
changes suggested by our account of the Trinity, we will get a fairly com-
plex set of relations holding between the various senses of the copula, as 
the following diagram makes clear: 
Different 
(e.g., 'Socrates is wise') 
A. 'Is' of Identity 
(e.g., 'Cicero is Tully') 
1. 'Is' of Accidental Sameness 
(e.g., 'Athena is bronze') 
'Is' of Essential Sameness 
(e.g., 'The Father is God') 
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Second, our solution helps to make clear that both the problem of material 
constitution and the problem of the Trinity are generated in part by the fact 
that we have incompatible intuitions about how to count things. Thus, both 
problems might plausibly be seen as special instances of a broader counting 
problem-a problem that arises whenever we appear to have, on the one 
hand, a single object of one sort (e.g., God or material object) and, on the other 
hand, multiple coinciding objects of a different sort (e.g., Person, or hylomor-
phic compound). One significant advantage of the Aristotelian solution to the 
problem of material constitution is that it alone seems to provide a unified 
strategy for resolving the broader problem of which it is an instance.30 
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NOTES 
1. For purposes here, an object x and an object y stand in the relation of 
material constitution just in case x and y share all of the same material parts. 
Thus, on our view, material constitution is both symmetric and transitive. 
Contrary to some philosophers (e.g., Lynne Baker, discussed below) who treat 
material constitution as asymmetric, we think that there are good theoretical 
reasons for regarding it as a symmetric relation; but we will not attempt to 
defend that view here. 
2. Noonan 1988, 222. 
3. Note, however, that we stop short of actually endorsing the solution 
that we describe. There are three reasons for this. First, our solution, like most 
others, attempts to provide a metaphysical account of the ultimate nature of 
God. But surely here, if anywhere, a great deal of circumspection is warranted. 
Second, the contemporary Trinitarian debate, as we see it, is still in its infancy; 
hence a definitive stand on any particular solution, including our own, strikes 
us as a bit premature. Third, the solution we develop strongly supports a spe-
cific understanding of material constitution (as will become clear in Section 
4)-one that is at odds with some of our previously considered views on the 
matter. (See, e.g., Rea 2000.) But, given the current state of the Trinitarian 
debate, we are uncertain whether this fact should motivate us to change our 
views about material constitution or to continue exploring yet other alterna-
tives to the currently available accounts of the Trinity. Thus, it is important to 
understand that we are not here aiming to resolve the contemporary 
Trinitarian debate once and for all, but rather to advance it by introducing 
what seems to us to be the most promising solution to the problem of the 
Trinity developed so far. 
4. Quicumque vult (our translation). 
5. Denying that 'is God' means 'is absolutely identical with God' doesn't 
guarantee that modalism is false; but making the denial removes any pressure 
toward modalism that might arise out of T1 - T3. 
6. See Rea 2003 and Brower 2004. Proponents of the Relative-Identity strat-
egy include Cain (1989), Anscombe & Geach (1961, pp. 118-20)' Martinich (1978, 
1979), and van Inwagen (1988). Proponents of the more typical versions of the 
Social-Trinitarian strategy include Bartel (1993, 1994), Brown (1985,1989), Davis 
(1999), Layman (1988), C. Plantinga (1986, 1988, 1989), and Swinburne (1994). 
The position is commonly attributed to the Cappadocian Fathers. (See, esp., 
Brown 1985, Plantinga 1986, and Wolfson 1964). It is against these relatively 
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typical versions of ST that our previously published objections most straightfor-
wardly apply. Among the less typical versions of ST are, for example, Peter 
Forrest's (1998), according to which the Persons are three "quasi-individuals" 
that result from an event of divine fission, and CJ.F. Williams's (1994), accord-
ing to which "God is the love of three Persons for each other." We reject 
Forrest's view because it implies (among other things) that there is no fact about 
whether there are one or many Gods, and there is no fact about whether there 
are three or many more than three Persons. On his view, 'one' is the lowest cor-
rect answer to the question 'How many Gods are there?' and 'three' is the low-
est correct answer to the question 'How many persons are there?'; but it is sheer 
convention that allows us to say that' one' and 'three' -rather than, say 'twenty' 
and 'two hundred and forty one' -are the correct answers to those questions. 
As for Williams's view, we take it that his, along with other less common ver-
sions of ST, will fall prey to objections similar to those we raise against the more 
typical versions. For further critical discussion of both the Relative-Identity 
strategy and the Social-Trinitarian strategy, see Bartel 1988, Cartwright 1987, 
Clark 1996, Feser 1997, Leftow 1999, and Merricks 2005. 
7. Note that the point of 03 isn't to deny that the Persons compose a soci-
ety. Of course they do, if there are genuinely three Persons. Rather, the point 
of 03 is to deny both that the name 'God' refers to the society composed of 
these Persons and that the Persons are proper parts of God. But if the society of 
Persons is the Trinity, and the Trinity is God, doesn't it follow that 'God' refers 
to the society of Persons after all? No. Each member of the Trinity is God, and 
God "is a Trinity" (that is, He exists in three Persons). But nothing in ortho-
doxy seems to require that the Trinity is itself a whole composed of three 
Persons and referred to by the name 'God'. Moreover, in light of objections to 
Social Trinitarianism raised here and elsewhere, it seems that orthodoxy actu-
ally precludes us from saying such a thing (which is part of why we reject 
Social Trinitarianism). 
8. See Rea 1998 and Brower 2004. 
9. For reasons that we shall explain below, the label 'accidental sameness' 
is not appropriate in the context of the Trinity 
10. This claim is negotiable; and, in fact, there are independent (non-
Aristotelian) reasons for thinking that "masses of matter" must be treated as 
individuals. (See, e.g., Zimmerman 1995). But the view of matter articulated 
here seems to comport best with Aristotle's metaphysiCS and with the solution 
to the problem of the Trinity that we will propose, and so we will go ahead and 
endorse it here. Those who think of masses of matter as individuals may be 
inclined (in Section 3 below) also to think of what we will call "the divine 
essence" as an individual. Were we to endorse this view, we would deny that 
the divine essence is a fourth Person or a second God (just as we would deny 
that Socrates's matter is a second man co-located with Socrates). Rather, we 
would say that the divine essence is one in number with God, a sui generis indi-
vidual distinct from the Persons and, indeed, nothing other than a substrate for 
the Persons. We would also deny that there is any sense in which the divine 
essence is prior to or independent of God. 
11. We place 'its' in parentheses to signal our neutrality on the question 
whether, say, the humanity of Plato is a special kind of trope or a multiply 
instantiated universal. 
12. See, e.g., Metaphysics H2, 1042b15-25. 
13. Matthews 1982,1992. 
14. Topics A7, l03a23-31; Physics A3, 190a17-21, 190b18-22; Metaphysics 06, 
1015b16-22, 1016b32-1017a6; Metaphysics 09, 1024b30-1. 
15. Topics A7, 103a23-31; Metaphysics 06, 1015bI6-22, 1016b32-1017a6. 
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16. And, we might add, the same would hold true for Socrates and his mat-
ter, if indeed the matter of a thing were to be understood as an individual dis-
tinct from that thing. 
17. See, e.g., Lewis 1993: 175, and Robinson 1985. 
18. An object belongs to a kind in the nominal way just in case it displays 
the superficial features distinctive of members of that kind. 
19. Lewis 1986: 252. 
20. We assume that 'object' in the context here means 'material object'. 
21. Here is why 'the object in R' is ambiguous. There aren't two material 
objects in R; and the material object in R isn't a third thing in addition to 
Athena and Lump. 1hus, , Athena = the material object in R' and 'Lump = the 
material object in R' must both express truths. But they can't both express 
truths unless either Lump = Athena (which the doctrine of accidental sameness 
denies) or 'the material object in R' is ambiguous. 
22. Baker's definition appears in both Baker 1999 and Baker 2000. For criti-
cal discussion, see Pereboom 2002, Rea 2002, Sider 2002, and Zimmerman 2002. 
23. Elsewhere we distinguish between pure and impure versions of the 
Relative Identity strategy (see Rea 2003). Impure versions endorse R1 without 
endorsing a doctrine of relative identity; pure versions endorse R1 in conjunc-
tion with either R2 or R3 below. Our solution is thus an impure version of the 
Relative Identity solution. 
24. To say that sortal-relative identity statements are more fundamental 
than absolute identity statements is, at least in part, to say that absolute identi-
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